Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea aims to settle "all issues relating to the law of the sea".1 The globally socially just distribution of the vast resources of the sea, living, and non-living, is one such issue. The Convention translates this issue into two governance tasks, i.e. the general apportionment of such resources among States and the delimitation of overlapping claims by several States to the same maritime spaces and their resources. On its face, the Convention merely prescribes that the delimitation achieves an equitable outcome.2 Since the drafting of the Convention, the search for equitable principles infra legem that might assist in this task has been ongoing. The has mostly focused on the judicial development of such principles.3 Yet, on their face, the relevant Convention provisions primarily mention delimitation by agreement of States.4 The first purpose of this paper is to develop a framework for delimitation that takes account of this value judgment of the Convention. To do so, the delimitation of maritime spaces is seen as a task for institutionalized oceans governance. The overall objective of an equitable delimitation result is to be achieved on the basis of two broad normative approaches underpinned with political and judicial machinery for their legally binding concretization in contested instances. Pursuant to the rationale that the land dominates the sea, the Convention for one offers a geographical approach, through the concept of maritime zones seawards of the land, comprising the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf. The Convention also countenances an alternative,
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The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36-66 non-geographical approach based on historic titles in customary law. These approaches then need to be concretized into operational principles, as well as rules and decisions. Courts and tribunals have been making considerable progress over time in developing such principles, culminating in the Arbitral Tribunal in the recent Bay of Bengal case declaring delimitation of overlapping claims of coastal States on the basis of the median line modified by relevant circumstances to constitute acquis judiciaire, which is said to form a source of law within the meaning of Art. 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.5 These judicially developed principles leave a considerable margin of appreciation to States, and it thus falls on the political mechanism of the agreement of the coastal States concerned to achieve an overall equitable delimitation on the basis of the most suitable equitable principles.
The second purpose of the paper then is to exemplify the workings of delimitation by agreement of States. It uses the case of the South China Sea (SCS), for the twin reasons of that sea's significance and of its capacity to test the paper's model rigorously. First, the several, and acute delimitation disputes of the riparian States of that sea will have to be resolved by agreement, since a judicial decision is not to be available at least as far as China is concerned. Second, the claims by its riparian States of entitlement to its resources are based on both zonal and non-zonal grounds, throwing into relief that any delimitation governance must accommodate both.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the Convention's general approach to the socially just distribution of marine resources seawards of the land, discussing the judicial shaping of equitable principles and their implications for settlement of delimitation disputes by agreement of States. Section 3 moves to exemplifying the insights gained, providing background on the SCS scenario. Section 4 establishes that the disputes of the SCS cannot be judicially decided as no court or tribunal has jurisdiction in regard to China. Section 5 examines what the applicable equitable principles are on which the riparian States could base a negotiated agreement for that sea. The Conclusions point out the implications of the article's findings for analysts and for actors. 
The Equitable Distribution of Marine Resources
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The Equitable Delimitation of Contested Maritime Entitlements under the Law of the Sea Convention: Norms, Machinery and Principles
The distribution of marine resources raises the question of global social justice. The Convention embodies a universal, rules-based approach to this distributive task. The overall objective of the Convention is to secure the just and equitable distribution of marine resources within the legal order of the oceans that the Convention establishes. It spells out this overall objective of its approach in its preamble. The Convention intends to establish an objective legal order for the oceans to promote the equitable utilization of marine resources, according to the third preambular paragraph of the Convention. 6 The achievement of that goal will then contribute to a just and equitable international economic order, as the next preambular paragraph indicates. The Convention distinguishes three categories of marine resources that end. First, it subjects the resources of the deep seabed, certainly the mineral resources thereof, to the principle of common heritage of mankind, involving a strong re-distributional element among all States. Secondly, the resources of the high seas are subject to the jurisdiction of each State, reverting to its capacity and will to exploit those. Thirdly, the resources landwards of the deep seabed and the high seas are subject to the jurisdiction of a specific State. In order to identify that State, the Convention employs two normative, equitable principles. The Convention bases itself, first, on the approach that the land dominates the sea (2.1). But it also countenances a role for the principle that historic uses of the sea ought to translate into present resource allocation (2.2). But the Convention also establishes bifurcated machinery for their application, in the shape of judicial and political decision-making in delimitation disputes (2.3). While it is true that the judicially developed equitable principles then become binding for States (2.4), States retain a considerable margin for delimiting their maritime boundaries (2.5).
2.1
The Land Dominates the Sea: Zonal Apportionment and Delimitation The approach that the land dominates the sea, originally formed in customary law and incorporated into the Convention, captures the equitable norm
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The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36-66 that input ought to determine the share in the output.7 The input here is the presumed or generalized effort of the coastal state to husband the resources in the waters and seabed seawards of its coast. This geographical approach underlies the legal concept of maritime zones. The Convention designs three such maritime zones: the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf, in which the coastal State is to enjoy sovereignty or sovereign rights over the resources found there. This approach then applies to the two distinct functions of apportionment of zones to individual coastal States vis-à-vis the international community and of delimitation of zones between two or more coastal States.8 In fact, the Convention law makes explicit that the delimitation of the maritime zones between States with adjacent or opposite coasts must achieve an equitable outcome.9 Equity here becomes equity infra legem.
2.2
Non-Zonal Apportionment and Delimitation The role that geography plays in the apportionment and delimitation of marine resources under the Convention is, however, complemented by a non-geographical approach, in the shape of the role that historic title and historic use play. This also is an equitable norm, not just one of legal certainty. Historic title and uses store concrete collective efforts, the sustained input into governing and using oceans spaces by a State and its citizens that ought to be considered with regard to the current distribution. However, historic title remains one of the least well-settled legal concepts of the Convention. No definition or test has been provided by a court or tribunal under the Convention since its entry into force, although the historic title would refer to legal concepts and facts predating the Convention. Both ITLOS and the Arbitral Tribunal in the two Bay of Bengal cases have avoided doing so in regard to the term "historic title" featuring in Article 15, other than indicating that such title would have to be argued. To induce some doctrinal rigour, two questions then need to be distinguished.
The first question is the legal status of historic title. This is indeed a concept of the customary international law of the sea, rather than the Convention. Historic title was first recognized in regard to maritime boundaries prior to the conclusion of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention in Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries. There, the ICJ defined historic waters as waters which are treated as internal or territorial waters but which would not have that character but for the existence of a historic title. The Court recognized the historic use of waters as a non-geographical factor capable of justifying the apportionment of waters to a State.10 In the case, the Court required the consistent practice of the coastal state claiming those waters-there through a system of straight baselines-and the toleration of that practice by the international community and any specially interested other State.11 The issue of historic title arose again at the Law of the Sea Conferences. A study by the UN Secretariat had defined historic waters as waters over which coastal states, contrary to generally applicable rules of international law, clearly, effectively, and continuously, exercise sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the interested States. It appears that everyone was content with this at the First Conference.12 At the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, States could not establish general agreement on the role of historic titles for the allocation of maritime spaces.13 The Convention therefore recognizes the category of historic title as customary law. This was succinctly stated by the ICJ in Continental Shelf, for a Convention then still in draft:
[T]here are, however, references to "historic bays", or "historic title" or historic reasons in a way amounting to a clear reservation to the rules set forth therein [in the Convention]. It seems clear that the matter continues to be governed by general international law which does not provide for a single "regime" for "historic waters" or "historic bays", but only for a particular regime for each of the concrete cases of "historic waters" or "historic bays". It is clearly the case that, basically, the notion of historic rights or waters and that of the continental shelf are governed by distinct legal régimes in customary international law. The first régime is based on Roeben The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36-66 acquisition and occupation, while the second is based on the existence of rights "ipso facto and ab initio".14 There is a clear parallel with the acquisition of title over land, requiring the exercise of authority à titre de souverain reinforced by the absence of protest by other States. Such "historic titles must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have always been by long usage", and a State may base distinct legal claims on that concept.15 In Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute handed down after the entry into force of the Convention,16 the Court endorsed Continental Shelf emphasizing that the statement from Anglo Norwegian Fisheries needed to be read in the light of the subsequent Continental Shelf.17 That case discusses the regime that such waters may have under customary law. The Chamber found the Gulf of Fonseca to constitute a historic pluri-state bay with a sui generis regime.18 This particular historical regime established by practice was especially important given the lack of any agreed and codified general rules even for single-State bays.19 The Chamber did not have to pronounce on the conditions for the coming into existence of such historic bays as the parties were agreed that the Gulf of Fonseca was a historic bay. But it can be surmised that the existence of a historic bay and its legal regime are subject to the usual conditions of customary law formation, including relevant concrete historical events such as international court judgments. This rationale can be transferred to the concept of historic title over waters.20 Such title forms in customary law and its concrete legal regime can be either sui generis, or it can be associated with any general and codified rules of the law of the sea, for instance on internal waters, territorial waters, or the exclusive economic zone.
The second question concerns the reference the Convention makes to this customary law concept of historic title. The last preambular paragraph of the Convention affirms "that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law" and that makes clear that custom will continue to have a role in the law of the sea even after the Convention's entry into force. It thus has to be established whether the Convention incorporates this custom, or rather leaves the issue to be regulated by customary international law outside the conventional regime. The Convention refers to historic title and similar notions of historic status in various contexts-bays (Art. 10(6)), maritime boundary delimitation (Art. 15), and archipelagic waters (Art. 46(b)). The Convention thus recognizes that the concept of historic status can be compatible with the very Convention establishing a legal order for the oceans.21 It then takes a position that incorporates some such historic status, while leaving others to the customary law. Thus, historic archipelagos are incorporated into the conventional regime, while historic bays are excepted from the conventional regime for juridical bays.22 For historic title over marine resources, the Convention's position is that it incorporates those. Art. 15 states explicitly that historic title can be a relevant circumstance leading to deviating from the equidistance method in delimitation disputes. But this would now also apply to the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, given the extension of the equidistance/ relevant circumstances method to these maritime zones in the recent jurisprudence. Even the lesser historic use of marine resources becomes a factor of an equitable delimitation result. Where, for instance, access to historic fisheries is cut off with catastrophic effect, that requires the equidistance line to be adjusted.23 By contrast, the Convention text is silent on historic title to waters located outside any of the conventional maritime zones of a coastal state. The incorporating reference is, however, implied. Extra-zonal, where a State's claim is not based on any zonal entitlement, the customary historic title has a function of apportionment. The coastal State receives qua customary law exclusive rights over water and its resources that would otherwise be high seas or fall under the zonal entitlement of another State.
2.3
Judicial and Political Decision-making in Delimitation Disputes Arts. 74(1) and 83(1) only enunciate the broad objective that an equitable outcome is to be reached in every delimitation case. Both the zonal and the nonzonal approaches described above can assist in this task, but they are located at considerable level of abstraction and thus are not capable of being directly applied in contested cases. Only Art. 15 also indicates a means to achieve this Roeben The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36-66 outcome, providing that the median line (equidistance) method should be used unless there are special circumstances such as historic rights.
However, the Convention compensates for the normative indeterminacy of this objective of equitable delimitation and the dearth of standards, by institutionalizing machinery for reaching an equitable result.24 It provides for both judicial decision-making and for political decision-making embodied in the legally binding agreement of States.
2.4
Developing Equitable Principles Judicially The Convention provides for comprehensive judicial decision-making on delimiting maritime boundaries contested between States Parties. Art. 74(2) and 83(2) refer delimitation disputes to the procedures under Part XV entailing a binding decision. This is adjudication by ITLOS or the ICJ or arbitration as the default procedure (Art. 287(3)).
The court or tribunal having jurisdiction under Part XV will then not just decide the delimitation case at hand. It will also, in each case, contribute to the development of the equitable principles transferable to other cases. The socially just distribution of global goods, such as marine resources, is a matter of broad norms accepted internationally.25 Relevant equitable principles have, however, been fleshed out in a rich body of judgments and arbitral awards rendered in marine boundary delimitation disputes. These judgments and awards coalesce around a clear preference for the equidistance/relevant circumstances method, applying it to the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf. As restated in the most recent Bay of Bengal Award, this method has three stages. The first stage involves the identification of a provisional equidistance line "using methods that are geometrically objective and also appropriate for the geography of the area in which the delimitation is to take place".26 The second stage considers relevant circumstances that may call for the adjustment of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result.27 The jurisprudence gives some guidance on the relevant considerations.28 The decision whether to adjust a provisional equidistance line, as well as the decisions on how much and in which direction the line should 
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The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36-66 be adjusted, then requires an assessment of the facts and the probable impact of the provisional equidistance line, which is largely a matter of appreciation. The third stage consists of an ex post check of non-disproportionality of the result reached at the second stage for each maritime zone.
The equidistance/relevant circumstances method is the default method for judicial maritime boundary delimitation. This is also true for the International Court of Justice,29 even though that court has stated that the three stage process is not to be applied in a mechanical fashion and that it will not be appropriate in every case to begin with a provisional equidistance/median line.30 The main alternative is the angle-bisector method. It applies where there are "factors which make the application of the equidistance method inappropriate",31 generalizing irregular coastal features through a linear approximation of the relevant coasts. It starts with rendering the Parties' relevant coasts as straight lines depicting their general direction. The angle formed by the intersection of these straight lines is then bisected to yield the direction of the delimitation line. The functions of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf do not bar a court or tribunal from delimiting the outer continental shelves of two adjacent States along these lines pending the issuance of recommendations, although not of two coastal States with opposite coasts.32 This equidistance/relevant circumstances method is based upon geometric techniques, as is the alternative angle-bisector method.33 These geometric techniques express the foundational zonal principle for delimiting maritime zones between states. They are technical means for realizing the equitable principle that the maritime entitlement of a state should be proportionate the relevant coast, and thus its land.
2.5
The Margin of Appreciation of States The elaborate provision of the Convention for judicial settlement of delimitation disputes must not obscure the Convention's preference for a negotiated, political settlement of such disputes by the States concerned. their maritime zones by agreement-territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf. The agreement reached either explicitly or tacitly will then be determinative. Such treaty becomes the legal form for the political agreement that the States concerned are to reach by way of negotiation. In this regard, the Convention imposes on the coastal States concerned both an obligation of conduct and result. The conduct of each State must be such that the negotiations are meaningful. And the result must be equitable. The Convention also provides procedures to aid States in reaching an agreement, in particular conciliation. In addition, they are supported by the administrative mechanism embodied in the Outer Continental Shelf Commission, which issues recommendation to each State for delineating its single continental shelve beyond 200 nm.34 The role of these recommendations where the outer continental shelves of two States with opposite or adjacent coasts overlap is not specified. Arguably, States should base their delimitation agreement on any recommendation, while they may still deviate from them for good reasons. They may also reach that agreement pending one or both recommendations.
The judicial and the political mechanisms outlined are to a considerable degree alternatives, rather than fully interchangeable, because of the functions and capacities each has and their impact on outcomes. A key issue then is the relationship between them. The substantive Convention provisions prioritize political decision-making as primary and judicial decision-making as secondary, because the latter becomes available only where the efforts at a negotiated settlement of the maritime boundaries of two or more States have been exhausted.35 The procedural law of the Convention reinforces this. Section 3 of Part XV counter-balances the principle of compulsory third party dispute settlement of a delimitation dispute with optional exceptions.36 Art. 298(1)(a)(i) allows each State to make a constitutive declaration excepting However, the said, judicially developed equitable principles will apply to all future delimitation disputes, and not just those submitted to third party settlement. The Convention imbues those principles, couched in abstract and general terms, with binding effect for courts when deciding cases and for States when settling their maritime boundaries by way of an agreement. The Convention's underpinning the broad objective of equitable delimitation with judicial machinery empowers that machinery to generate equitable principles at a lesser degree of abstraction susceptible of being applied in disputed cases.42 All pertinent rulings of courts and arbitral tribunals, including those rendered under special agreements, where they converge on such a principle then indeed form an acquis judiciaire.43 This acquis is a source of international law under Art. 39(1)(d) ICJ Statute.44 It shapes the international law on which any delimitation must be based (Arts. 15, 74(1); 83(1)). Still, the reach of these judicially authorized principles has certain limitations, so that the States remain called upon to provide equitable principles through their practice. Three such limitations need be considered further.
Firstly, there are the uncertainties in the jurisprudence that result from the fact that a generalizable principle on an important delimitation but has not been developed yet. This is true in particular for the role of insular lands. When ITLOS was faced with the problem of islands in the delimitation process in its Bay of Bengal case,45 it simply stated that the effect to be given "depends on the geographic realities and the circumstances of the specific case" and that there was no general rule in this respect. Each case was unique and called for specific treatment, the ultimate goal being to reach a solution which was equitable.46 Thus, ITLOS did not provide a principle or generalizable rule.47 As a result, the international jurisprudence on the role of islands in the delimitation process continues to lack the necessary coherence. 48 Secondly, the judicially developed principles so far involve a considerable margin of appreciation on the facts. This is also true for the equidistance line.49 States also retain a margin of appreciation as to the law, since they may determine their zonal entitlements under the Convention by way of an agreed method that deviates from the median line.50 In addition, the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf emphasized that "there is no legal limit to the considerations that states may take into consideration for the purposes of making sure that they arrive at equitable principles". Thirdly, the capacity of courts and tribunals to develop equitable delimitation principles remains inherently circumscribed. The court or tribunal only has jurisdiction to delimit those sea areas marked by overlapping claims by the 48 The region has proven oil reserves of around 1.2 km³ (7.7 billion barrels), with an estimate of at least 4.5 km³ (28 billion barrels) in total. Natural gas reserves are estimated to total around 7,500 km³.
51
The This makes it necessary first to determine the scope of the conventional optional dispute clause. Of relevance here is subparagraph a) (i) of that provision (4.1). There then follows the second step of determining whether the present disputes fall thereunder.70 These disputes concern the substance of the 
Scope of the Optional Exception Clause of the Convention (Art. 298(1)(a)(i) UNCLOS)
Art. 298(1)(a)(i) has two variants that except two different though closely related types of disputes. The first variant excepts "disputes concerning interpretation or application of Arts. 15, 74, and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations". For a dispute to be a delimitation dispute, at its heart there must be overlapping claims by States to parts of the sea based on the concepts of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or the continental shelf. The rationale of this exception is that such disputes concern the existence of the sovereign rights of the coastal State and that the standards on sea boundary delimitation have not been clarified sufficiently.71 This rationale has not been superseded, since the law on maritime boundary delimitation is still evolving.72 Art. 298(1)(a)(i) in its second variant excepts disputes "involving historic titles". Within Art. 298(1)(a)(i), historic titles form a category of dispute that is separate from maritime delimitation disputes. This is clear from the fact that the Convention already treats historic title as part of the zonal maritime delimitation. Disputes involving historic title include both their interpretation and application, so that disputes regarding the rules on historic titles as well as their concrete existence are excepted. The wording of the provision indicates that 'historic title' is separate from other conventional concepts. Importantly, then, the term does not refer exclusively to historic title where recognised by the Convention.73 Disputes involving other historic titles are covered as well. This also corresponds to the object and purpose of the provision. Since consensus on a conventional definition of historic title proved elusive at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea,74 the solution that the Convention proffers in this situation is to proceduralise this substantive law question. A court or tribunal is competent to consider customary title incidentally (Art. 293 (1) 
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The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36-66 plausible on law and on fact under the Convention to be able to invoke the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, the reverse holds true. In particular, claims to historic title by one party must be substantiated and must comprise a substantial part of the overall dispute to ground an exception the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal that would otherwise exist. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal over the dispute as to the lawfulness of the NineDash-Line is thus excepted if it has to be determined by reference to Arts. 15, 74, and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations or the rules on historic title. Answering this question requires an assessment of the objective substance of the Nine-Dash-Line.
4.2
The Substance of the Nine-Dash-Line Falls under Art. 298 The substance of the Nine-Dash-Line is matter of its content, status and function, seen in the context of China's actions in regard to the SCS.
As to its content, China's U-Shaped Line is composed of nine dashes and extends to the southern part of the SCS, adjacent to the shores of Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. of international law and in accordance with the equitable principle, and that it reaffirms its sovereignty over all its archipelagos and islands as listed in Art. 2 of the 1992 Law.78 The Nine-Dash-Line was internationally used by China for the first time in 2009, being attached as a map to its response to the joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of the continental shelf made by Malaysia and Vietnam. The Chinese Note states that the Line includes "sovereignty over the islands in the South China Seas and the adjacent waters" and "sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil".79 In response to a Philippines Note Verbale,80 China restated in 2011 in another Note that it had sovereign rights over the islands, waters and the seabed of the SCS, on historic and legal grounds, and to the maritime zones generated by the Nansha Islands/Spratlys, a territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf.81
The pertinent national legislation is in essence as follows. The Declaration on Territorial Sea of 4 September 1958 announced that a 12 nm territorial sea surrounds all Chinese territories, including the Chinese mainland, the specifically named SCS islands, and all those other islands claimed by China which are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by high seas. Art. 2 of that Law includes within its land territory the four island groups in the SCS as well as other islands comprised within China's twelve-mile territorial sea. Art. 3 authorizes the use of straight baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea; the baselines for the Xisha Islands/Paracels consist of straight lines linking twenty-eight coordinates. In 1998, China established its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf "throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory", which comprises the said SCS insular features according to the 1992 Law.84 Art. 14 of the 1998 Act provides that "the provisions of [the] Act shall not affect the historical rights of the People's Republic of China". 85 The principal physical embodiment of the Nine-Dash-Line then is a map to which certain unilateral acts by China make reference. The general status of maps is under international law is that they have evidential, not constitutive value for an international legal act, such as a treaty, a court decision, or a unilateral act.86 A map may, however, serve as context for the interpretation of any such act. The international jurisprudence makes that plain. The ICJ, after discussing the evidential value of maps in Frontier Dispute, there stated that maps may acquire legal force "when [they] are annexed to an official text of which they form an integral part".87 Similarly, the Arbitral Tribunal in Bay of Bengal considered that it should not attempt to establish the land boundary terminus "on the basis of the wording of the Radcliffe Award without giving due regard to the attached map".88
Whatever the understanding of the Nine-Dash-Line was before the time that China became bound by the Convention, it has referred to it in making claims after becoming party to the Convention. These claims are unilateral acts.89 Unilateral acts need to be interpreted with particular weight accorded to the discernible intention of the acting State. 90 The relevant Chinese prac- The principal function of the Nine-Dash-Line then is a summary reference to the bundle of concrete zonal claims in regard to the waters and the seabed that fall under the categories of territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, as generated by the mainland of China and the claimed insular lands in the SCS. These claims are plausible. The concrete insular lands potentially generate relevant maritime zones, certainly the Nansha Island/ Spratlys and also Huangyan Dao/Scarborough Shoal regardless of whether it is an island or a just a rock with a territorial sea. The general rules on the delimitation of the maritime zones of states with opposing coasts also apply to off-lying insular lands. It is true that the International Court of Justice has occasionally disregarded very small islands or not given them their full potential entitlement to maritime zones, where this would have a disproportionate effect. 94 In other instances, however, the Court has acknowledged that insular features create their own maritime zones and taken these into consideration in delimiting the zones of the other party with an opposite coast.95 And so has ITLOS.96 These plausible claims then define a zonal delimitation dispute falling under Art. 298(1)(a)(i) first variant. The Nine-Dash-Line is thus inextricably linked to these zonal claims of China.
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Residually, the Nine-Dash-Line refers to claims based on historic title over waters and the seabed of the SCS, which it also evidences. These claims have been made in other forms, in particular the 2011 Note. It is plausible that there can be historic title to SCS waters held by China within and beyond its claimed maritime zones, both on law and on fact. That is the case. As shown above, under the Convention historic title can play a role infra-zonal, as a relevant circumstance for the equitable delimitation of two opposite coasts. And historic title can play a role extra-zonal, as acquisition of waters falling under established concepts or as special regime under the customary law of the sea. The parties may disagree as to the role for historic title, in particular in regard to zones of overlap resulting from projections seaward from the mainland coast, and on as to whether such a customary regime has actually formed on the use of the fishery resources in the SCS. Yet both these disputes concerning the legal role and the concrete regime of such rights "involve" non-zonal historic title and are, for that reason, excepted from the jurisdiction of the tribunal by virtue of Art. 298(1)(a)(i) second variant.
Substantively, the Nine-Dash-Line is thus an integral part of the claims of China in regard to marine zones and/or historic title in the SCS, to be delimited from those of the Philippines. These claims fall under Arts. 15, 74, or 83 of the Convention. The dispute as to the substance of the Nine-Dash-Line is thus excepted by Art. 298(1)(a)(i) first and second variant.
4.3
The Form of the Nine-Dash-Line However, the Philippines submission may be taken to address not the substance, but the form of the Nine-Dash-Line, that is the very means by which China expresses and evidences its claims. The critical question is whether the form in which a State expresses its claims to maritime zones and titles can affect a right that the applicant can plausibly point to as potentially violated. Yet, there is no separate right of a state that another make its maritime claim in a specific form. The Convention does not have a numerus clausus of forms of actions for States parties, which remain free to express their intention in a manner they choose. State practice under the Convention and in many judicial delimitation cases confirms that States state their claims in maximal forms. It may be desirable that States make their maritime claims in a manner that is as precise and as possible. But as long as the form chosen does not constitute a refusal to negotiate contrary to Arts. 15, 74(1), and 83(1), it remains ancillary to what is in essence a dispute over maritime delimitation, historic title, and sovereignty over insular land. 
4.4
The Legal Status of the Insular Features of the SCS The Philippines second application regarding the status of the insular lands in the SCS under the Convention also falls under 298(1)(a)(i). The status of these concrete insular lands cannot be determined in the abstract. Rather, qualifying these insular lands under Art. 121 would have a direct impact on the maritime delimitation dispute pending between the Philippines and China and which is excepted by Art. 298. The qualification of these insular lands, whether they are islands at all, and then whether they are rocks with just a territorial sea or full islands with an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf, thus determines, as an automatic and direct consequence the existence and the extent of the maritime zones they entail.
In addition, Art. 298(a)(i) in fine makes clear that disputes that involve the concurrent consideration of sovereignty over insular land are excepted from compulsory dispute settlement. Yet, assessing the status of these insular lands necessarily involves the consideration of the sovereignty over these lands.97 For an abstract question relating to the Convention will not ground the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.98 A State may only request clarification of the status of such insular lands over which it is sovereign or claims sovereignty. Sovereignty over the Nansha Islands/Spratlys and Huangyan Dao/Scarborough Shoal being claimed by both parties to the dispute, the status of these insular lands under the Convention involves the concurrent consideration of disputed sovereignty over these lands, and it thus becomes a dispute excepted by Art. 298(1)(a)(i). provisional arrangements of a practical nature" (Art. 74(3) and Art. 83(3)). 99 States may draw on the procedures that Section 1 of Part XV of the Convention devises.100 Such maritime delimitation disputes that are excepted from a judicial or arbitral decision then become subject to mandatory conciliation. The parties will then be obligated to negotiate an agreement that implements the conciliation proposal (Art. 298(1)(a)(ii)). Where they do not reach agreement, any third party-settlement again presupposes their mutual consent. Although the wording of Art. 298(1)(a)(ii) is unclear in this respect, this interpretation reflects Art. 299 stating that any dispute excepted under Art. 298 may be submitted to third party-settlement only with the consent of both parties.
However, delimitation disputes requiring the concurrent determination of disputed sovereignty over insular land are not subject to this mandatory conciliation (Art. 298(1)(a)(i) in fine). The term "insular land" refers to Art. 121(1) adopting the general definition under international law of islands as any land above water at high time regardless to size. The sovereignty question arises "concurrently" in a dispute concerning the delimitation of maritime boundaries where the insular land is situated within 200 nm of the coast of either party.101 That is the case for the insular lands disputed between the Philippines and China located within 200 nm of the coast of the Philippines. It is unclear whether this removes from mandatory conciliation the dispute in its entirety or only to the extent that the concrete insular lands and maritime zones that they generate are concerned, in which case the boundary would remain subject to mandatory conciliation to the extent that the disputed land is not affected. 102 Given that the claims of the parties to the waters and the seabed of the SCS overlap, even though based on different entitlements, the overarching obliga-
The Equitable Distribution of Marine Resources
The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36-66 tion for the riparian States then is to achieve an equitable delimitation of the areas concerned, "on the basis of international law". In what follows, the paper sets out two relevant equitable principles for discharging this obligation.
5.1
The Land Dominates the Sea The Bay of Bengal Tribunal, in justifying its delimitation decision, has highlighted the notion that the land dominates the sea.103 This equitable principle also covers insular land of the SCS. Art. 121 confirms that islands are capable of generating maritime zones of their own, then further differentiating islands in a narrower sense with their own territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, from rocks that only have a territorial sea.
Concretising this equitable principle in the case of the insular lands of the SCS then requires determining who has sovereignty over each of them. This is a matter of general international law, which holds that each insular land, however small, that remains above water at high tide is capable of appropriation by States.104 Such appropriation requires effective exercise of State power. Several types of state power are apt to acquire title over such land.105 Their actual exercise needs to be proportionate to the insular land in question. In remote regions it can be minimal. The absence of any objection by third States reinforces the title. The ICJ decision in Sovereignty over Pedra Branca is particularly illustrative, concerning disputed sovereignty over tiny uninhabited and uninhabitable islands in the Singapore Straits. There, the Court confirmed that original title over such land can be acquired by both territorial and personal historic exercise of authority, including over fishermen. general temporal cut off is the time that the sovereignty dispute has crystallized, so that acts by any of the disputants after that time are irrelevant.109 Any detailed application of these principles to the SCS insular lands is obviously beyond the scope of the present paper and will require further study. 110 The Convention concretizes the foundational equitable principle that the land dominates the sea by creating maritime zones of the coastal state based on a norm of geographical distance from the relevant coats. As regards the capacity of the insular lands in the SCS to generate maritime zones, it needs to be noted that the terms "island" and "rock" that Art. 121 UNCLOS employs have never been defined in international adjudication. States retain a large margin of appreciation in each instance, in regard to the very consideration of specific insular features as well as whether they are generating an own territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf remain a matter of appreciation. This is true for insular features near the mainland coast. State practice generally takes into account the effect of islands and even low-tide elevations in drawing agreed delimitation lines.111 In Black Sea, the Court accepted for instance that the parties had accorded to Serpent Island a 12 nm territorial sea by treaty, although they later disagreed on its status under Art. 121.112 It is also true for insular features further off the mainland coast.113 The Barents Sea Agreement apparently accords the Svalbard archipelago the capacity to generate its own continental shelf, independent of that of the Norwegian mainland. 114 The delimitation of the maritime zones of two States with adjacent or opposite coasts in the SCS can then follow the three-stage methodology described above. Still, the equidistance-cum-relevant circumstances method has so far 63
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The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36-66 been judicially applied only for purposes of delimiting two overlapping claims based on the same conceptual entitlement, that is territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf. It is not clear that and how it would apply to claims based at least partially on historic title, as it the case for the SCS. In such case, the use of the equidistance method may become inappropriate, in line with the caveat in Caribbean Sea. Or, States could consider historic title a relevant circumstance to modify the provisional equidistance line at the second stage. Courts and tribunals have accepted as such a relevant circumstance one State being cut-off by the provisional equidistance line from claiming an exclusive economic zone or a continental shelf.115 But the list of relevant circumstances is open to further additions.116
At any rate, equidistance/relevant circumstances remains one delimitation method and in this sense it is dispositive law. States remain free to base their delimitation agreement on other principles than the median line. In Maritime Dispute, the Court found and accepted a (tacit) agreement of the parties delimiting the territorial sea and parts of the exclusive economic zone in variance from the median line.117 Indeed, as the delimitation of maritime boundaries rests primarily on the agreement of the States, these are free in the criteria that they want to base their agreement on, including historic title. State practice has yielded some particularly innovative approaches, often as a result of particular geographic, historical, and other factors at play.118 In this practice, historic titles indeed often underlie express or tacit agreements.119
5.2
Historic Title and Uses The second applicable equitable principle is historic title and historic use in the SCS, within and outside the Convention-defined maritime zones. Particularly for Asia, arbitral tribunals and courts have been ready to allocate title to land territory on the basis of historic and more recent effectivités,
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The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36-66 including over water, where there is appropriate evidence.120 States have considerable leeway in determining the exact legal regime for such title. The Land, Island and Maritime Dispute as well as the Eritrea/Yemen Award highlight that a regime of the joint use of waters disputed by the riparian States on historic grounds can be an equitable outcome. The Barents Sea Treaty accommodates a special regime for historic uses-fisheries-within an overall zonal approach to the disputed resources. Its preamble states that the parties are "aware of the traditional Norwegian and Russian fisheries in the Barents Sea". In its operative part, Art. 4 prescribes that the fishing opportunities of either party shall not be adversely affected by the Treaty. The parties shall closely cooperate, with a view to maintain their existing respective shares of total allowable catch volumes and to ensure relative stability of their fishing activities for each of the stocks concerned. It bears noting that the Treaty embraces a more lenient standard for the consideration of existing fisheries for delimitation purposes, than the catastrophic effect on such fisheries that the jurisprudence has demanded in order to be considered a relevant circumstance capable of modifying the provisional equidistance line.121
5.3
Equality of Outcome Finally, an overarching equitable principle for States reaching a settlement of sea boundaries in the SCS may simply be absolute equality of outcomes.122 Under it, the area of conflict demarcated by the overlapping claims would be divided on the basis equal shares for either party. This outcome-focus may be particularly appropriate where the claims are based on different delimitation methods within the zonal approach. The Barents Sea Treaty is an illustration. That Treaty is apparently based on an equitable sharing of the disputed sea area arising from the overlap of the sector lines claimed by Russia and the median lines claimed by Norway. 123 To ensure such parity of outcome, States then remain free to create and transfer functional rights over waters that
The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36-66 would fall within any of their maritime zones, regardless of whether these are covered by overlapping claims. Again, the Barents Sea Treaty provides illustration. Art. 3 of that Treaty signs over to Russia a sea area located within 200 nm of the Norwegian coast but beyond 200 nm from to the Russian coast. The Treaty makes clear that this area does not become part of the Russian exclusive economic zone but rather receives a special legal status. Such parity of outcome-focus may also be appropriate where the claims to the disputed waters are based on the zonal approach by one party and the non-zonal approach of the other.
Conclusions
The 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention aspires to the internationally just distribution of the marine resources situated between the land and the deep seabed and high seas. This aspiration underlies not just their apportionment, but also the delimitation of the overlapping claims between several coastal States. The paper has demonstrated the Convention to form institutionalized oceans governance for that purpose. Where the claims of several coastal States overlap, the Convention requires that the resulting delimitation produce an equitable outcome. The Convention then provides machinery to achieve this indeterminate objective, comprising a judicial and a political mechanism. The judicially developed equitable principle of equidistance/relevant circumstances method in particular would apply to future boundary agreements between States as well. Still, primarily States are to provide a political solution through agreement. States retain a considerable margin of appreciation for States in regard to what they will consider an equitable outcome under two broad approaches. The Convention proffers the distributional approach that the land dominates the sea, realizing through the concept of the maritime zones for coastal states that it sets forth. While this is strictly geographical, the Convention also countenances historic title grounded in customary law as a non-geographical basis for resources distribution. The SCS then provides a litmus test for the Convention's capacity of achieving a just distribution of ocean resources in this complex scenario of overlapping claims by riparian States based on zonal and non-zonal entitlements. No comprehensive judicial decision-making is available there, given that China's declaration under Art. 298(1)(a)(i) excepts all disputes relating to the delimitation of maritime zones or to historic title in that sea. Such equitable delimitation and thus distribution of the resources of the SCS must be achieved through one or several agreements concluded by the riparian States. Of particular relevance for the
Roeben
The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36-66 SCS then are three equitable principles: that the land dominates the sea, comprising the consideration of its insular lands under disputed sovereignty and appropriate zonal delimitation; the recognition of historic title and historic uses of the SCS; and a focus on an outcome based on equal share of the disputed waters for States, including through creation and transfer of functional rights. State practice, such as the recent Barents Sea Treaty, indicates how these principles could be concretized. The analytic implication of the article's finding that equitable maritime boundary delimitation is underpinned by the judicial and political institutionalization is that that both mechanisms produce equitable principles capable of being applied in future cases. The challenge for analysts of the law of the sea then is to legally conceptualize the interaction of these principles. There are also implications for the relevant actors within this institutionalized oceans governance. For courts and tribunals, as judicial actors, the key implication is that the acquis judiciaire on equitable delimitation principles ought to be further clarified on key issues, such as islands and historic title. The implication for States, as the political actors, is that they must take judicially developed and developing equitable principles into consideration, as these shape the "international law" standard that States have to base their agreed marine resources allocation on. Still, States may and indeed must make use of their considerable margin of appreciation in reaching an overall equitable result, and, in so doing, take guidance from relevant state practice.
